Before we
jump into the narrative below I would like to bring to light some myths
that were blown out of the water or need to be blown up for the benefit
of the reader.
1) This narrative is written by a Pakistani army officer and is fairly unbiased, in fact it is uncharitable towards muslims in some cases. We can accept the narrative as fairly true.
2) British always said Native Infantry (NI) were not good. In a nut shell native troops never related or cared for company business. Native infantry got enlisted for employment, privileges and occasional loot not to fight wars for the East India co. No wonder they mostly dispersed after an initial engagement. Which necessarily does not mean they were not good fighters. 1857 was a case in point. NI hammered the British and they had to fall back on Sikh army to subdue the revolutionaries.
3) Muslims often accuse Hindus and Sikhs of being hand in glove with the British to end Muslim rule but on the contrary as proved here it were the Muslims who sided with the British to destroy a common enemy. This was often the rule than an exception.
4) An observation I have made of British empire and its victories many as they were have been against weak or disorganised foes. British have quit in face of adversity Afghanistan, America, China, Sudan, Egypt, Persia etc are places they could never colonise no matter how hard they tried.
5) Losses and eviction in South East Asia and Europe during WW2 is well known. The superior Japanese martial race (using a oft used English phrase) rolled back the empire permanently from Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Burma till the British managed to get help from Indian troops. Elsewhere without support from allies in the later stages of the war England could not hold out against the determined Germans who massacred and booted out the British from mainland Europe.
6) A lot of battles won in India were fought by NI and not English troops. Frontal assaults and initial charges were given to Native Indian troops. Once the enemy was softened up is when the English troops would come and finish of a worn out enemy if he still stood.
Thus with the above view in mind of the 'British martial race' lets proceed with a very beautifully written but forgotten chapter in war. This itself shows how British hid their failures and a large part of their history.
The forgotten British reverse in India and published in Defense Journal Karachi August 2000 issue A battle in which more Britishers died in one day than in a any other battle fought in India Afghanistan Nepal or Iran. A battle in which the British lost more officers on one day than all officers of Pakistan or Indian Army killed in 1965 war. Originally written by me after 1 years research. Initially submitted to Journal of Military History USA but not published because of Anglo Saxon biases.
1) This narrative is written by a Pakistani army officer and is fairly unbiased, in fact it is uncharitable towards muslims in some cases. We can accept the narrative as fairly true.
2) British always said Native Infantry (NI) were not good. In a nut shell native troops never related or cared for company business. Native infantry got enlisted for employment, privileges and occasional loot not to fight wars for the East India co. No wonder they mostly dispersed after an initial engagement. Which necessarily does not mean they were not good fighters. 1857 was a case in point. NI hammered the British and they had to fall back on Sikh army to subdue the revolutionaries.
3) Muslims often accuse Hindus and Sikhs of being hand in glove with the British to end Muslim rule but on the contrary as proved here it were the Muslims who sided with the British to destroy a common enemy. This was often the rule than an exception.
4) An observation I have made of British empire and its victories many as they were have been against weak or disorganised foes. British have quit in face of adversity Afghanistan, America, China, Sudan, Egypt, Persia etc are places they could never colonise no matter how hard they tried.
5) Losses and eviction in South East Asia and Europe during WW2 is well known. The superior Japanese martial race (using a oft used English phrase) rolled back the empire permanently from Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Burma till the British managed to get help from Indian troops. Elsewhere without support from allies in the later stages of the war England could not hold out against the determined Germans who massacred and booted out the British from mainland Europe.
6) A lot of battles won in India were fought by NI and not English troops. Frontal assaults and initial charges were given to Native Indian troops. Once the enemy was softened up is when the English troops would come and finish of a worn out enemy if he still stood.
Thus with the above view in mind of the 'British martial race' lets proceed with a very beautifully written but forgotten chapter in war. This itself shows how British hid their failures and a large part of their history.
The Battle of Chillianwalla 1849
by Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN
by Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN
The forgotten British reverse in India and published in Defense Journal Karachi August 2000 issue A battle in which more Britishers died in one day than in a any other battle fought in India Afghanistan Nepal or Iran. A battle in which the British lost more officers on one day than all officers of Pakistan or Indian Army killed in 1965 war. Originally written by me after 1 years research. Initially submitted to Journal of Military History USA but not published because of Anglo Saxon biases.
The list of
military disasters which the British suffered in India is long, but
most of these were rationalised by British military historians by
highlighting situational factors which made British defeat certain and
inevitable and was in many cases due to circumstances involving
overwhelming numerical inferiority, excessive battle exhaustion, adverse
weather and terrain etc. The Battle of Chillianwala fought on 13
January 1849 is, however, one odd exception and stands out as a battle
in which the British failed to defeat their opponents despite having the
advantages of weight of numbers, ideal weather and terrain, superior
logistics etc. In Afghanistan the British disaster was explainable
since the British force which was destroyed while retreating from Kabul
to Jalalabad was a vastly over numbered exhausted and logistically very
weak force of some 700 Europeans and 4,500 Native troops which was
destroyed by a vastly superior Afghan force in adverse mountain terrain
and very cold weather. At Bhurtpore the British failure to capture the
mud fortress was ascribed by a British military historian to lack of
adequate artillery. At Chillianwala a British Army which had a high
European troop component large number Sepoy (regiments), sufficient
artillery, two heavy cavalry brigades to ensure that no one could
surprise the British army, excellent logistics, little campaign
exhaustion having fought no major battle since assumption of
hostilities, winter weather negating the possibility of heatstroke and
cholera the worst killers of white soldiers in India,failed to defeat
the Sikhs. Chillianwala thus stands out as a battle which changed
Indian perceptions about British military effectiveness and had a direct
link with the “Great Sepoy Rebellion” or “The Indian War of
Independence” of 1857.
A
succession of British military victories since 1757 barring few
exceptions like Battle of Pollilore (September 10 1780), Siege of
Bhurtpore (1804-1805), Monsoon’s Retreat (1804), Kabul Brigade’s Retreat
(January 1842) which were dismissed as exceptions (to the general rule
of “European Superiority) by virtue of exceptional numerical or other
odds; it was assumed that no Native army of India, Nepal or Afghanistan
could stand a determined bayonet charge by the Red Coats. A feeling of
superiority was produced accompanied by the natural attitude of over
confidence and rashness, and most British commanders felt that simply a
direct march to the sound of guns and a simple frontal assault using
“Cold Steel” was enough to disperse any native army however tough or
well trained. The uses of manoeuvre or taking into account the
“Independent Will of the Enemy” and the fact that a British army could
ever be surprised was dismissed as impossible. Thus once the British
suffered a rude reverse accompanied by heavy casualties despite having
all the advantages; public opinion in Britain was shocked. The British
Commander in Chief General Gough was replaced by Charles
Napier. Subsequently when the Sikhs were defeated at Battle of Gujerat
(21 February 1849) British military historians rationalised their defeat
at Chillianwala by laying the blame on “Bad Terrain” “Lack of
Artillery” “Cowardice of the Native Troops” etc. Chillianwala was
forgotten and Gough again became a hero. The damage done at
Chillianwala to the prestige of British arms was enormous and played a
major role in changing Indian attitudes about the British, leading
directly to the “Great Sepoy Rebellion” in which the British almost lost
their Indian Empire and the English East India Company whose private
Bengal Army had fought Chillianwala lost India to the British Crown!
BACKGROUND
The Sikh
religion was founded by Baba Guru Nanak (1469-1539) whose prime aim was
to increase communal harmony between the Muslims and the Hindus.
Initially the Sikhs were very peaceful and preached pacifism. Their
followers were confined to the north West Indian region of Punjab (in
modern India and Pakistan) and were mostly peasants from the sturdy
“Jat” caste. In the period 1606-1675 the Sikhs came into conflict with
the Mughal Emperors and became a very militant political group;
primarily because of religious persecution by the Mughal Emperors.
The Gurus persecuted were:--
1. The
Fifth Guru - Guru Arjan Dev because of the fine on him by Jahangir as he
sheltered his fleeing rival (Dara?) at Amritsar. He was asked to
convert to Islam at Lahore (there still is a gurdwara at Lahore Fort
where he was jailed and eventually died), refusing which Maulavi
prescribed the punishment "to show the hell right here on earth as
depicted in Quran" so for the first three days he was not given any
water (month of June in Lahore) as well as his body was wrapped in the
cow hide. Then 4th day the hot sand was poured on his body. On fifth
day he was made so sit on the "Tava" or "hot plate", sixth day hot sand
was poured on his body while sitting on the hot plate and on the seventh
day his body was thrown into the river Ravi on the orders of Jahangir.
2. The sixth Guru, Guru Hargobind was jailed at the fort of Gwalior for 10 years.
3. The seventh Guru, Guru Har Rai was hunted by Mughals all over Punjab.
4. The
ninth Guru, Guru Tegh Bahadur was martyred at Chandani Chowk Qotwali
(delhi in front of the Lal Kila) on the orders of Aurungzeb, he went to
Delhi to plead with the emperor to stop converting the Kashmiri Brahmins
to Islam.
5. Tenth
Guru, Guru Gobind Singh ji was attacked by Aurungzeb at Anandpur, his 5
year old and 7 years old sons were killed (for not converting to islam)
at Sarhind along with his mother, his 15 year old and 17 years old sons
attained martyrdom fighting at Chamkaur, He himself was murdered by
Mughals at Nanded (close to Bombay) but was able to appoint the Guru
Granth Sahib as the eternal Guru.
6. The
Sikhs who look to the book Sri Guru Granth Sahib as their eternal guru
had to face many more persecutions. Baba Banda Bahadur along with 760
Sikhs were martyred at Delhi for not converting to Islam by the
successor of Aurungzeb.
As a
consequence of this repressive policy the peaceful Sikhs became fiery
rebels and were persecuted by the Mughals in the period 1675-1748. Their
places of worship were desecrated and demolished, whole male population
were massacred and they were denied the right to carry arms. The Sikhs
resorted to Guerrilla warfare and succeeded in surviving Mughal
oppression despite being a minority community (just around 8 % of the
population of Punjab. The Sikhs compensated in quality for their lack
of numbers and by 1757 emerged as a strong political community who
harassed all invaders who passed through Punjab. By 1799 the Sikhs
occupied Lahore the capital of Punjab under the leadership of a
brilliant military commander Ranjit Singh (1780-1839) who united the
loose knit Sikh confederacy of various local chiefs and conquered whole
of Punjab and large parts of the Indo-Afghan frontier till the Khyber
Pass, Kashmir and parts of Ladakh (Tibet) creating a strong and stable
state by 1818 and consolidating and enlarging its frontiers to their
maximum extent by 1833. It was Ranjit Singh who expelled the Afghans
permanently out of Northwest frontier territory of India which the
Afghans had occupied since 1739 by completing his conquest and
annexation of Peshawar on 6 May 1834. 3 From Indo-Pak history point of
view this was a unique achievement since Peshawar area was re-occupied
by a non-Muslim army for the first time since 1001 A. D4. Thus Ranjit’s
re-occupation of Peshawar was reversal of 833 years of history of
foreign (both ethnic as well as
religious
subjugation)! This disproves Indira Gandhi’s claim of having reversed
1000 years of history in 1971 once Pakistan lost the 1971 war. As a
matter of fact Indira’s claim is ridiculous since the Hindu Marathas
occupied Delhi as early as 1758.
Ranjit
Singh was fully aware that survival lay in following European military
methods and organisation introduced in India by the French and British
since the Seven Years War. He induced many European soldiers of fortune
who had reached India following the Napoleonic wars to join the Sikh
Army. Thus two Europeans i.e. Allard (French) and Ventura (Italian) who
had served in Napoleon’s army till Waterloo were the pioneers among the
total of some 36 Europeans and 3 Americans who joined Ranjit’s army
between 1822 and 18395. The Europeans in the employment of Ranjit
included some 12 Frenchmen, 7 Anglo Indians, 4 Italians, 3 Britishers, 3
Germans, 2 Greeks, 2 Spanish, 1 Russian, 1 Scotch and 1 Prussian. This
varied composition meant that fresh diverse and varied influences from
Europe incorporating the lessons of Napoleonic wars were directly
transmitted to Ranjit’s army. Ranjit appreciated that confrontation
with the English East India Company, which became Ranjit’s southern
neighbour following the 2nd Maratha War (1803-5) would be costly and
impractical. Therefore, Ranjit followed a policy of neutrality during
the period 1809-1839.
It may be
noted that Ranjit initially employed Hindustanis (mostly Hindu Rajputs
and Brahmans from Gangetic plain east of Ambala in such large numbers
that up to 1813 the majority of Ranjit’s regular troops were Hindustani
mercenaries from the east of Jamna and south of Ambala region. From
1813 onwards this trend was reversed and Ranjit switched to a largely
Punjabi Jat Sikh regular army. In addition Ranjit also employed some
Punjabi Muslims in the infantry and a much larger number of Punjabi
Muslims in the artillery. As per one estimate there were 41 high
ranking Muslim officers in the Khalsa Sikh army out of which two were
generals, one i.e. Ilahi Baksh from the artillery7. Ranjit’s policy in
this regard was to ensure Sikh preponderance in the army, while ensuring
that there were Hindu and Muslim officers and soldiers in the army to
act as a counter weight and source of information against any possible
Sikh led conspiracy against Ranjit’s rule. Ranjit’s brilliant albeit
Machiavellian ethnic/religious diversity policy paid rich dividends
since Ranjit survived at least two serious Sikh coups masterminded by
the Sindhianwala family.
Ranjit
Singh died on June 27 1839. The legacy that he left was a very strong
army and extremely imbecile and debauch successors. The Sikhs were a
minority and Ranjit’s policy of Divide and Rule involved employment of a
large cross section of Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims in various ranks and
appointments. Thus the Sikh state required a man of genius to run it
smoothly since most of the nobles had no direct loyalty to the Sikh
state by virtue of belonging to other religions. Ranjit had many sons
but Kharak Singh the only one who was considered legitimate and who thus
succeeded him was a very weak and incompetent ruler. He was deposed
within four months and succeeded by his son Naunehal Singh who was very
competent man but met with a premature death, being crushed under a
falling arch soon after assuming power. He was succeeded by one of
Ranjit’s illegitimate sons who was despised by the army and nobles and
was soon removed from power. Rani Jindan one of the many wives of
Ranjit and a former dancing girl now usurped power, ruling in the name
of Duleep Singh her five year old son from an unknown father, but
supposedly affiliated to Ranjit Jindan nominated her paramour a Hindu
Brahman Lal Singh as the Vizier (Prime Minister) and another Hindu
Brahman Tej Singh as Commander-in-Chief. The trio of the Rani and her
two confidants were afraid of the power of the Sikh Army and in order to
destroy it planned the First Sikh War (1845-46). The Sikh Army was
incited and launched across Sutlej River (the Anglo Sikh) boundary to
invade English East India Company’s territory with the ulterior aim of
destroying the Sikh Army, while negotiating a peace with the British and
continuing to stay in power after the Sikh Army had been destroyed.
Thus at the Battle of Feroz Shah (22 December 1845) the British Army
was at the mercy of the Sikhs. As a result of treachery and poor
leadership the Sikh Army was thus decisively defeated at the Battle of
Sobraon (10 February 1845) and the Sikh State came under the domination
of the English East India Company. Punjab was now placed under a
council of Regency composed of various Sikh Nobles led by the British
Resident Henry Lawrence who was ruling on behalf of the infant Daleep
Singh. The Sikh Army was not disbanded but a British force was stationed
at Lahore, an annual tribute levied on the Sikh state and British
officers posted in various districts to supervise revenue collection and
administration.
THE SECOND SIKH WAR 1848-49
The Sikh
Army had been humiliated but not destroyed in the First Sikh War. The
Sikh soldier felt that he had not been defeated militarily but merely
betrayed by his leaders who wanted the destruction of the Sikh Army and
acted treacherously. The Muslims who were the vast majority welcomed
the British victory since under the old Sikh state the Muslims were
second class citizens and many of their places of worship were used as
Gunpowder magazines and Stables.
Dewan Mul Raj’s Rebellion at Multan
In April
1848 Diwan Mul Raj the Sikh Governor of the southern Punjab province of
Multan who was a Hindu, rebelled against the British Regent and all the
Sikh troops at Multan joined him. The British organised three columns
to march towards Multan; one under General Sher Singh (3,382 cavalry and
909 infantry), One under Lieutenant Edward (4,033 cavalry and 7,718
infantry), the column of the neighbouring British vassal Muslim state of
Bahawalpur under Lieutenant Lake (1,900 cavalry and 5,700 infantry).
In addition a British Division under General Whish (8,089 men, 32 siege
guns, 12 horse artillery guns) was also sent to co-operate with Sher
Singh and assist him in capturing Multan. General Whish’s Division
joined Sher Singh and the other three columns under joint command of
General Cortland of the Sikh Army (an Anglo Indian soldier of watching
Multan in August 1848 and formal siege operations were commenced against
the fort city of Multan. The besiegers numbering nearly 32,000 against
Mulraj holding Multan with 12,000 men 54 guns and 12 mortars11. On 14th
September Sher Singh with all his Sikh troops went over to the rebel
side. General Whish was forced to raise the siege and to withdraw few
miles south of Multan and entrench himself awaiting reinforcements,
waiting to be reinforced by another Division of the English East India
Company’s Bombay Army marching from Sindh to reinforce Whish.
Mulraj did
not trust Sher Singh and would not let him enter the fort! Both the
leaders met outside the fort in a temple and Sher Singh agreed to move
north and join his father Chattar Singh the Governor of Hazara province
who had already rebelled on 20 August 184812. Mul Raj as a goodwill
gesture decided to advance money to Sher Singh to pay his troops.
Another possible reason why Sher Singh decided to move north was the
fact that Multan was a 98 % Muslim majority area and the main Sikh
population centres and the major Sikh troop concentrations were in areas
north of Lahore. Thus on 9th October 1848 Sher Singh started marching
northwards along the left bank of Chenab River. Initially he moved to
within 25 miles of Lahore but finally decided to take a position north
of river Chenab and wait till the major Sikh Army formations north of
Lahore joined him, finally launching an advance on Lahore. Meanwhile
Sardar Chattar Singh rebelled (he shot Canard an American who refused to
join him) along with his Sikh troops in November 1848 and marched
towards the strategic Attock Fort on the river Indus. The Sikh troops
holding Attock fort and those at Peshawar also joined him thus the
British lost almost the whole of area north of river Chenab in addition
to the Multan fort. Thus a local rebellion was transformed into a Sikh
national rising. The major advantage which the British possessed
however was the fact that 90 % of the population which was Muslim was
with the British. Chattar Singh also lured Dost Mohammad Khan the ruler
of Afghanistan to join him promising him cession of all old Afghan
territory taken by Ranjit Singh west of river Indus. Dost Mohammad was
not sincere about helping his old enemies and his prime interest was
regaining Peshawar. Therefore he helped the Sikhs in a very lukewarm
manner sending a mere 5,000 troops.
Assembly of Gough’s Army of the Punjab and invasion of Punjab
The
government of the English East India Company had meanwhile issued orders
for the assembly of an army to invade Punjab and crush the Sikh rising
under the leadership of the overall Commander in Chief India and also of
the East India Company’s Bengal Army, General Sir Hugh Gough (C in C
since 11 August 1843). It may be noted that General Gough a veteran of
Napoleonic wars had already successfully commanded the Bengal Army in
the First Sikh War. The Army of the Punjab started assembling at the
frontier town of Ferozepur from mid October. The total strength of this
army was about 16,000 troops. Gough wanted to start the advance as early
as possible but was delayed due to procrastination on part of Lord
Dalhousie the Governor General of India. 15 Nevertheless Gough managed
to send a cavalry brigade (H. M 3rd Dragoons, H. M 14th Light Dragoons,
8th Bengal Native Cavalry, 12th Bengal Irregular Cavalry) reinforced by
one Royal Army and one Bengal Native Army infantry regiment under
Brigadier General Cureton a very brave and capable cavalry officer to
observe area north of Lahore along the line of river Chenab. This
brigade crossed river Ravi on 2nd November and took an
observation position at Qila Deedar Singh (see map), over 50 miles
Northwest of Lahore and 8 miles short of the Sikh advance position at
Ramnagar; waiting to be reinforced by another infantry brigade. Soon
another brigade i.e. Eckford’s brigade (two native infantry regiments)
also joined Cureton. The aim of pushing Brigadier General Cureton’s
Detatchment north of Ravi river
was to act as a bait to entice Sher Singh to march south of Chenab river with his main body and to attack Cureton.
The
situation in November 1848 was that Sher Singh had assembled a sizeable
Sikh force north of Chenab River while a smaller force was guarding
Ramnagar ford staying south of the river. Sher Singh’s father was
assembling another Sikh force in Peshawar area, but very slowly and
negotiating with the Afghans to reinforce the Sikhs. Gough wanted to
destroy Sher Singh’s force before Chattar Singh could join him and make
the Sikh position stronger. Chenab was however a complete water
obstacle even in winters and not easy to ford except after careful
reconnaissance. On 6th November Gough reached Ferozepur to take personal
charge of the ongoing preparations for the invasion of Punjab. On
hearing news about the fall of Peshawar Gough became deeply concerned
about the necessity to advance immediately and defeat Sher Singh before
he could be reinforced by Sikh troops concentrating at Peshawar. Thus on
8th November he ordered Brigadier Colin Campbell (later to be famous as
Lord Clyde) with an infantry brigade at Lahore to march Northwest wards
and reinforce Curetons force and to also assume the command of the
whole force. Campbell marched from Lahore on 10th November with two
native infantry regiments. On 13 November the Gough reached Lahore and
on 15th November authorised Brigadier Campbell to attack the advance
Sikh position at Ramnagar; in case of a favourable opportunity. On 16th
November Gough started his advance with the main body of the Army of the
Punjab from Lahore towards Campbells position south of Ramnagar. On 17th
November Gough learnt that another Sikh force of troops who had also
rebelled at Bannu west of river Indus had also joined Sher Singh’s main
body north of Chenab. On 18th November Gough received intelligence that
Sher Singh had withdrawn bulk of the troops of his advance position at
Ramnagar north of Chenab,leaving some outposts south of the river. On
21st November Gough joined Campbell with the main body at Campbells camp
8 miles south of Ramnagar. The whole of Gough’s army was now
concentrated opposite Ramnagar except his two heavy artillery batteries.
It may be noted that the highest authority in East India Company’s
government in India was the Governor General;the 37 year old Lord
Dalhousie. Dalhousie had issued clear orders to Gough that no operations
north of river Chenab were to be undertaken till Multan was captured
and the heavy siege train from Multan joined Gough.
Sardar Sher Singh Attariwalla ambushes Gough at Ramnaggar
Dalhousie
explicitly forbade Gough from any operation north of Chenab River.
However this did not restrain him from attacking the reportedly small
Sikh Detatchment at Ramnagar on the south bank of Chenab. Gough who was
an impetuous Irishman was panting for action and decided to clear the
Sikh outpost at Ramnagar on 22nd November. In reality unknown to the
British the Sikh Detatchment south of Chenab was covered by two
batteries of heavy guns on the north bank of the river and one battery
deployed on an island dividing Chenab into two channels at Ramnagar. The
British on the other hand could not effectively reply with counter
bombardment since their two heavy batteries had still not joined them.
(The heavy guns joined the main body on 30th November). In brief the
British charged the Sikh infantry without adequate reconnaissance, their
cavalry got stuck into the sandy river bank and the net result of the
action at Ramnagar on 22nd November was 12 officers and 84 men 52 of
whom were killed including Brigadier General Cureton and Lieutenant
Colonel Havelock commanding officer and the rest wounded. What had
appeared at first sight a Sikh infantry detachment was covered by heavy
artillery which was out of range of the British guns, covered in
addition by Sikh cavalry which was hiding behind the sand bars. 14th
Light Dragoon saw a body of Sikh infantry at a distance in hasty retreat
towards the north bank of Chenab. At this juncture Gough took the
command of cavalry in his own hands and ordered 14th Light Dragoons and
5th Native light Cavalry to charge and intercept the Sikhs. In reality
this was an ambush into which 14th light Dragoons had been unwittingly
lured. Cureton watching from a distance had galloped towards 14th light
Dragoons in order to restrain them when he was struck by two matchlock
balls, one going through the head. Cureton was an ex cavalry trooper who
had served the entire Peninsular War in 14th Light Dragoons and risen
to become an officer. Brigadier Colin Campbell who was present
attributed this blunder to Gough’s interference in handling cavalry, not
allowing Cureton to proceed according to his independent judgement17.
The action at Ramnagar illustrated Sher Singh at his best and Gough at
his worst. By a brilliant combination of artillery infantry and cavalry
the Sikh imposed such a punishment at Ramnagar, that at least for the
next seven days Gough lost his offensive spirit.
The Cannonade of Sadullapur
Following
the costly success at Ramnagar Gough became cautious, at least for some
time, and decided to wait for his heavy artillery batteries, which
joined him on 30th November. Now he decided to turn the flank of the
Sikhs by sending a force up stream and crossing the Chenab at a ford
reported 8 miles north of Ramnagar. For this purpose Major General
Thackwell who had replaced Cureton as cavalry division commander was
tasked. Thackwell was given some 7000 men (1 British cavalry regiment, 4
Native cavalry regiments, 2 British infantry regiments and 5 native
infantry regiments) supported by 32 guns (30 field and two heavy). The
mission given to Thackwell was to “cross at any ford that he might
choose “… with the specific instructions that he must do so while
ensuring that” unless he could be sure of bringing his troops full and
fresh upon the enemy’s flank opposite Ramnagar by 1:00 pm the latest on
the 1st of December, he should take a second day to complete the
movement”. Due to confusion in initial battle procedures instead of
achieving surprise Thackwells force reached the reported ford at
Runneeke at 11 o clock in the morning instead of an hour before first
light as planned. The force discovered that there was no ford and the
river bed was even wider than that at Ramnagar which was a proper ford.
Three hours were wasted looking for another ford and this led the
outflanking force a further 12 miles up stream and 20 miles from
Ramnagar where they finally found some boats and crossed Chenab on the
night of 01/02 December 1848. The whole force completed the crossing by
two o clock on the afternoon of 2nd December,and found no Sikhs in front
They advanced ten miles along the northern bank towards Ramnagar and
halted at a village called Daurawalla. Thackwell also sent Gough a
detailed despatch about his operations north of Chenab. Meanwhile Sher
Singh came to know about Thackwells force around mid day on 2nd
December. The British army at this moment was divided and could have
been destroyed by Sher Singh in detail, if Sher Singh could concentrate
bulk of his force against Thackwell. However Sher Singh took half
measures, although initially he had resolved to march with his whole
force and crush Thackwell, on second thoughts he adopted a compromise
plan, under which he left a small infantry force with few guns opposite
Ramnagar to deceive Gough into thinking that the main Sikh body was
still opposite him and marched to attack Thackwell with a smaller force
around 8 or 9 thousand.
In the
meantime Thackwell received Gough’s orders on the night of 2nd December
to advance towards Ramnagar and attack Sher Singh, while Gough attacked
him frontally. Acting on Gough’s orders Thackwell commenced his advance
early on the morning of 3rd December. However as soon as few hours had
passed Thackwell received another despatch to halt and wait to be
reinforced by another infantry brigade which was crossing Chenab river
via another ford which had been discovered six miles north of Ramnagar.
Thackwell halted and while he was waiting for Godby’s Brigade was fired
upon by Sher Singhs artillery. The result was the artillery duel of
Sadullapur in which both the armies exchanged artillery fire without
coming into contact from 11 A. M to 4 P. M and after which Sher Singh
withdrew northeastwards. The British losses did not exceed 73. The aim
of Sher Singhs march towards Thackwell seems to have been to impose
delay on him for few hours, while Sher Singh’s main body withdrew north
towards Rasul into a very strong defensive position. In the meanwhile
Gough was doing nothing on 3rd December except engaging what he thought
were Sher Singh’s positions across Chenab with his artillery. Had Gough
showed some audacity on 3rd December the British could have easily
crossed the Chenab. Probably the rubbing received on 22nd November
certainly had succeeded in at least momentarily dampening Gough’s
offensive spirit, apart from Dalhousie’s instructions. Thus in words of
J. W Fortescue the pro establishment historian of the British Army,
“But the main fault lay with Gough himself, for he had been completely
outwitted by Sher Singh”. While Gough made no attempt to cross the
Chenab at Ramnagar on 3rd December, all that the British artillery was
pounding with full force was “half empty trenches and six guns” in words
of Fortescue22. Godby’s brigade which was supposed to have joined
Thackwell on the 3rd only partially joined him on the morning of 4th
December. This delay occurred because this newly discovered ford was
not a ford in reality and Goodbye had to use boats to cross it. After
the battle of Saddulapur Gough blamed Thackwell for not attacking Sher
Singh on 3rd December without waiting for Godby’s brigade and disowned
the orders sent to Thackwell to stop on 3rd December 23!
Fortescue
however excused Gough for all that had happened on 3rd December
consoling the leaders with the statement, “such miscarriages as these
are the common places of war... his good faith cannot be called in
question and as his staff kept no copies of the orders sent to
Thackwell, Gough did not know what he had or had not bidden him to do”!
But this is not all Fortescue went further and still extolled Gough’s
conduct saying, “However, the passage of the Chenab had been won at a
trifling cost, and that was after all, the main point”. Fortescue even
wants the readers to believe that there was a ford which Gough’s staff
had discovered but, the whole situation changed because of an ecological
change ie “it is certain that the ford had been carefully
examined....... There is however,nothing more treacherous than a glacier
fed river; and it is likely that the fords were never the same for
twenty four hours together”!
.png)
THE BATTLE OF CHILLIANWALA
Initial Situation
Thackwell
resumed his advance on 4th December with cavalry and saw no Sikhs in
front. Gough also sent cavalry in the at 8 A. M on 4th December. Gough
sent a long despatch to Dalhousie melodramatically describing the
passage of Chenab; “ It has pleased Almighty God to vouschafe to the
British arms the most successful issue to the extensive combinations
rendered necessary for the purpose of effecting the passage of the
Chenab, the defeat and dispersion of the Sikh force under the insurgent
rajah Sher Singh....” Gough wanted Dalhousie to fire a royal salute for
the passage of Chenab but Dalhousie refused since he did not agree with
Gough that the passage of Chenab was a great victory. On 6th December
Gough ordered Thackwell to form a standing camp at a place called Helan.
On 18th December Gough crossed the Chenab across a bridge of boats
laid at Ramnagar and joined Thackwell at Helan. Soon it became clear
through reports that the main Sikh Army had not been dispersed but
firmly entrenched at Rasul on the bank of river Jhelum. Meanwhile Gough
since he had already exceeded his instructions did not attempt any
major movement towards Sher Singh’s position at Rasul. The country
between Helan and Rasul was a sandy waterless plain interspersed by
patches of thick jungle.
Meanwhile a
column of the Bombay Army had finally reinforced General Whish at
Multan on 22nd December taking his force up to 15,000 regular troops
apart from some 20,000 irregulars. Multan’s siege was resumed and the
fort was assaulted beginning from 27th December. The city and suburbs
were captured by 1st January and the Citadel captured by 22nd January.
The British losses were 210 killed and 910 wounded. Gough received news
about arrival of Bombay column at Multan and the city’s capture on 6th
January. On 7th January Dalhousie who was now at Lahore wrote to Gough
that now that Multan had been captured, he would be rejoiced to hear of a
similar blow being struck at the Sikhs upon the Jhelum. Dalhousie’s
despatches to Gough were however non-committal; thus he urged him to
fight.... “If sure of a big success at small cost...” If he should deem
himself strong enough” Dalhousies vaguely worded despatch was enough for
Gough to once again start the job begun at Ramnagar on 22nd November.
Gough was under pressure to attack, but no explicit orders were given to
him by Dalhousie. Finally the news of the fall of the strategic
fortress of Attock on river Indus received on 10th January
acted as a catalyst. Fall of Attock meant that all Sikh troops
investing Attock and the Afghans could now easily reinforce Sher Singh
at Rasul. Major Mackeson the political officer at Gough’s camp also
urged Gough to attack following the news of fall of Attock.
Gough’s advance to Chillianwalla
Finally on
11th Gough resolved to attack Sher Singh. His plan of attack was to
advance to Dinga and from their march straight to Rasul and turn the
Sikh left. Despite having ample cavalry British intelligence about the
Sikh position was sketchy. As per Gough’s intelligence estimate the
Sikh position extended from Rasul situated on a line of ridges parallel
to river Jhelum to the vicinity of Mung a village 5 miles south west of
Rasul and again very close to river Jhelum. Rasul was situated on a
dominating height but immediately south of it was a plain intersected by
dry channels and a belt of trees and thorny scrub. The Sikhs had
entrenched the whole position but there was a wide gap between their
left at Rasul and their centre and right, which extended till Mung.
Gough had calculated that after leaving troops to guard his baggage, he
could muster 12,000 men and 66 guns to attack the Sikh position at
Rasul. The information which he had about the Sikh position was vague
i. e. that it extended from the village of Rasul on the left till
Lakhni Wala 6 miles to the south and facing east in a concave line with
the broad fast flowing Jhelum river to the rear. Fortescue who
exaggerated the odds as a matter of habit placed the Sikh strength at
30,000. Malleson who was dismissed by Fortescue as “pseudo historical”
“inaccurate” “slovenly” and “untrustworthy” estimated the Sikh strength
at Chillianwala to be in the neighbourhood of 23,000. British
historians do not agree on what was General Gough’s exact plan for 13th
January. Gough and Innes who wrote their book primarily to defend Gough
stated that it was Gough’s intention to march from Dinga to
Chillianwala, drive in the Sikh outposts and launch the attack on the
main Sikh position on 14th January after detailed
reconnaissance was carried out on the 13th January. Fortescue states
that on the evening of 12th January Gough summoned his generals and gave
them orders for the fateful morrow. However Fortescue does not
elaborate at all i. e. what were those orders for the fateful morrow!
PADDY GOUGHS FIRST PLAN, MARCH TO THE RIGHT AND ROLL UP THE SIKHS LEFT FLANK
On 12th
January Gough advanced 11 miles north to Dinga and encamped there. On
13th January he left two regiments of Native infantry, two of Irregular
cavalry and 2 guns to escort and protect hi baggage train which was to
follow him and began his advance at about 7 A. M towards Rasul. Goughs’
army covered a front of a mile and half while in marching order. All
the brigades marched in column with one cavalry brigade on each flank
and the European regiments leading the advance of each brigade. The
heavy guns were in the centre and the other horse and field batteries in
the gap between the four infantry brigades. After marching for five
miles he halted at a place from where a track branched to the village of
Chillianwala which was westwards off the road from Dinga at Rasul.
Gough’s intention was to carry out a reconnaissance. Engineers were
sent forward with cavalry to check whether the road was practicable for
the heavy guns or not. Once this was confirmed, the march was resumed.
Soon however some Sikh Army deserters who were mostly Muslim arrived
and informed the British through the political agent Major Mackeson that
the Sikhs were occupying the villages of Mujianwala and Chillianwala on
the left of the British in strength. It was probably at this juncture
that Gough changed his earlier plan of advancing till Rasul and then
taking the Sikh position by rolling up their left flank downwards.
Gough ordered some heavy guns and infantry to dislodge the reported
strong Sikh screen position at Chillianwala. This was successfully done
since the Sikhs offered only token resistance instead of exploiting the
dominating position of the mound over which Chillianwala was located and
quickly withdrew into the thick jungle west of Chillianwala. Gough now
personally rode to the village of Chillianwala while the British troops
who had cleared Chillianwala were deployed 500 yards west of
Chillianwala facing west, to carry out personal reconnaissance and
assess the situation himself. There was a thick jungle in front but
Gough observed the Sikh positions parts of which were visible to
understand that the Sikhs had swung their right and centre forward
leaving their entrenchment and were now deployed some 4000 yards west of
Chillianwala with the jungle in between masking their front and
Chillianwala. In response to the discovery of the Sikh positions so
close to Chilllianwala,Gough extended his brigades into deployed
formation. By the time Gough completed his reconnaissance it was 2:00
0clock in the afternoon and Gough decided to attack the Sikh position on
the next day. Because of the proximity of the Sikh Army it was now no
longer possible to stick to the old plan of marching to Rasul since this
would have exposed the left and rear of the British Army to a Sikh
attack from a position which they could barely observe from
Chillianwala. Gough now decided to bivouac on the open ground west of
Chillianwala and to launch main attack on 14th January. While the
British were making preparations to bivouac some Sikh artillery guns
opened fire on the British , from the positions hidden by the jungle.
The artillery fire was inaccurate and did little damage. Gough however
ordered the heavy guns to return fire on the Sikh positions which could
not be located. Once this was done, some thirty Sikh guns from different
point in the jungle in front opened fire. Gough suddenly realised that
he was too close to the Sikh positions and Sher Singh had full intention
of fighting on 13th January.
Sikh Dispositions and Plan of Battle
It is
necessary to examine the Sikh plan in order to understand the
developments till 2:00 P. M on 13th January. The Sikh position at Rasul
was not an ideal one in terms of cohesiveness or frontage. With 23,000
men they were occupying a concave shape position extending over six
miles with large gaps in between there left and their centre and right.
The entrenched Sikh position extended with the left resting on Rasul
and the right on Lakhni wala. All the six miles of this concave
position were not held by the Sikhs and there were gaps in between, the
most marked one between the Sikh centre and left. The Bannu garrison
was deployed at Lakhni wala, approximately a regiment of cavalry and
four infantry battalions, with eleven guns.
A mile to
the north were Lal Singh’s two regiments of cavalry and ten infantry
battalions and 17 guns deployed around Chak Fateh Shah, a further one
mile north there was Sher Singh at Laliani with one regiment of cavalry,
nine infantry battalions and some irregulars placed at 4,000 horse and
20 guns. The position from north of Laliani till Rasul was held by
irregular levies. 39 There is no independent and reliable Sikh account
of the battle, therefore we have relied on the above mentioned
description based on Fortescue’s narrative which is true as far as
general deployment is concerned but highly exaggerated as far as the
numbers are concerned, since Fortescue suffered from the usual Victorian
malady of magnifying the odds. Fortescue40 placed the total number of
Sikhs a Chillianwala at 30,000. A line of small ridges with thick
vegetation in shape of trees and thorny bushes and scrub covered the
entire Sikh front with small gaps right from Lakhni wala to Rasul. Rasul
itself was located on a very dominating ridge. The ridge on which the
Sikh position was based sloped gently towards the eastern plain from
which Gough’s army was expected to attack, but had abrupt slopes towards
its northern side which lay south of river Jhelum. From Lakhniwala till
Lulianee this ridge followed a roughly north south alignment, but
beyond Lulianee it changed direction to an east west alignment, also
gradually increasing in height till Rasul which was the highest point
being roughly 90 feet higher than the adjacent plain to the south of
Rasul. Durand who participated in the battle described the Sikh initial
defensive position as, “It was evident that the enemy occupied a
position too extended for his numbers”. Sher Singh’s original intention
seems to have been to force the British to attack a well entrenched
position under conditions of extremely limited fields of fire and
observation due to the thick jungle in front,which ensured that British
artillery could not effectively pound and soften up the Sikhs before the
main infantry attack. Another important strong point of his position
was the fact that the left flank was protected by river Jhelum while the
right flank was refused by virtue of being inclined backwards towards
Mung. It appears that Sher Singh decided on 12th January to slightly
change his plan when he received news of Goughs advance Sher Singh no
decided to bring his right and centre forward,ahead of the
entrenchment’s and give battle to the British under more disadvantageous
circumstances , rather than passively waiting for them , while the
marched without being opposed till Rasul and from there roll up the
whole Sikh position ,by attacking in oblique order. It appears that
keeping in view the line of British advance Sher Singh decided to swing
his right and centre forward and force the British to attack through
thick jungle country rather than allowing them to skirt round the jungle
and threaten him from his right flank. Whatever the actual case this
decision of Sher Singh stands out as the most brilliant tactical
decision of the entire Second Sikh War.
British Dispositions and Plan of Battle
The British
possessed superiority in artillery in terms of calibre of guns. Most
of the 60 pieces of Sher Singh were of small calibre, while Gough had 12
heavy guns and howitzers (8 eighteen pounder and 4 eight inch
howitzers), 17 nine pounders, 25 six pounders, and a number of horse
artillery guns, 66 in all. The British artillery was organised into two
heavy batteries of four 18 pounders and, two inch howitzer each, three
field batteries, and six horse artillery batteries, 66 guns in all. The
overall artillery commander was Brigadier Tennant and under him
Brigadier Brooke commanded the Horse artillery brigade while Brigadier
Huthwaite commanded the Foot Artillery. Once Gough ordered general
deployment for battle at about two-o clock the artillery was deployed as
following. The heavy gun batteries i.e. two batteries of four 18
Pounders each and two batteries of two 8 inch howitzers each, under
Majors Shakespeare and Ludlow with Major Horsford as the overall Heavy
artillery commander, thus a total of 20 heavy guns, were all deployed in
the centre of the British line. Three Troops of Horse Artillery
(Colonel Brind) of six 6 Pounder guns each and two field batteries
(Lieutenants Walker and Robertson) of 9 pounders under Major Mowatt were
attached to the left attacking division i.e. Campbells. The left
attacking division i. e Major General Sir Gilberts was supported by
three troops of Horse Artillery (Colonel Grant) and one Field Battery of
9 Pounders under Major Dawes.
The British
army was as earlier stated, divided into two infantry divisions i.e.
Brigadier General Colin Campbell commanding the 3rd Division or simply
the left division (and Major General Sir Walte Gilbert commanding the
2nd Infantry Division or left division. Both the infantry divisions
were supported by one cavalry brigade each on the outer flanks i. e 1st
Cavalry Brigade (HM 3rd Light Dragoons, 5th and 8th Bengal Native Light
Cavalry) of Brigadier White on the left flank and 2nd Cavalry Brigade
(HM 9 Lancers, HM 14 LD, 1st and 6th Bengal Native Light Cavalry) of
Brigadier Pop on the right flank. Campbell’s division consisted of
Brigadier Pennycuick’s Brigade (HM 24 Foot, 25 and 45 Bengal Native
Infantry) and Brigadier Hoggan’s Brigade (HM 61 Foot, 36th and 46th
Bengal Native Infantry). Major General Gilbert’s division consisted of
Brigadier Mountain’s Brigade (HM 29 Foot, 30th and 56th Bengal Native
Infantry) and Brigadier Godby’s Brigade (East India Company 2nd Bengal
European Infantry Regiment, 31st and 70th Bengal Native Infantry).
Brigadier Penny’s Brigade originally under Brigadier General Campbell
was the army reserve with two infantry battalions i.e. 15th and 69th
Bengal Native Infantry. The 20th Bengal Native Infantry along with 3rd
and 9th Bengal Native Irregular Cavalry along with three field guns was
designated as baggage guard with Brigadier Hearsay as baggage guard
commander.
We have
earlier discussed that Gough ordered his army to form up for battle at 2
o’clock. By 3 o’clock Gough’s army was formed up to attack. Four
infantry brigades each comprising two native and on British infantry
battalion commenced their advance towards the Sikh position east of the
thick jungle around three o’ clock. The jungle consisted of trees
interspersed with thick undergrowth and extremely thorny trees and
bushes sometimes referred to as “Musket” in the Punjabi Shikari
(Hunting) terminology. The closest European equivalent to this term is
brushwood.
Malleson
states that Gough was a “thorough believer in the bayonet and looking
upon guns as instruments which it was perhaps necessary to use but which
interfered with real fighting, he, wild with excitement ordered his
infantry to advance and charge the enemy’s batteries”. The reader may
note that the Sikh position was at least 1760 yards from the British
army and there was dense forest in between!
Brigadier Pennycuicks Attack
We will now
proceed brigade wise and briefly discuss the battle. Firstly we will
deal with Brigadier General Campbell’s Division. Campbell was a Royal
British Army officer born in 1792. He had see action under Wellington
in the Peninsular War and in 1849 had some 42 years of service behind
him. Son of a Glasgow carpenter Campbell was helped getting into the
class-conscious British arm through the help of a rich relative.
Campbell became, as was the norm at that time a colonel after some 30
years service. He was described by many contemporaries as “extremely
brave” and “thorough but “utterly devoid of dash” and “too cautious” and
“too selfish for any place” as is mostly the case with men with humble
origins who progress upwards slowly mastering all the red tapeism and
bureaucratic obstacles in armies! Campbell like Gough was a firm
believer in the power of the bayonet! Campbell’s prime responsibility
was to command and co-ordinate the function of both his brigades.
However keeping in view the adverse terrain he decided to accompany his
left brigade i. e Hoggan’s brigade in the attack while ordering
Pennycuick the right brigade commander to lead the attack on his own. .
Gough and Innes well summed up Campbell’s decision as following, “He
abrogated the duties of a divisional commander to discharge with
splendid success those of a brigadier”! However before the attack
commenced Campbell rode to Pennycuicks brigade and after briefing
Pennycuick about the attack rode on to HM 24th Foot, the British unit of
Pennycuicks brigade and gave them the following orders, “There must be
no firing, the work has to be done with the bayonet”. HM 24th Foot 1000
bayonets strong had newly arrived in India. The unit was thus highly
enthusiastic but highly inexperienced in the British Indian way of
warfare! By some oversight or due to an out of proportion sense of
excitement, once HM 24th Foot commenced its advance, it did so without
loading its muskets! Through some confusion the artillery designated to
provide fire support to Pennycuick trotted to the left. Pennycuick
advanced rapidly towards the Sikh position, HM 24th Foot doing so more
rapidly, full of enthusiasm to bayonet the accursed natives that thin
red line tipped with steel, as the British infantry at that time was
known! The Sikh artillery whose overall commander was Illahi Baksh a
Punjabi Muslim functioned admirably and as soon as 24 Foot came within
round shot range of 800 yards, it was effectively engaged by Sikh
artillery, and men starting falling. At 100 yards the Sikh infantry
engaged the unit with musket fire, but the unit advanced stoically
without firing back, their muskets unloaded, determined to do the work
with the bayonet a ordered by Campbell. 24th Foot was the first to
emerge in open ground west of the jungle outstripping both the native
units of Pennycuick’s brigade i. e the 25 and 45 NI on the right and
left flank respectively. To add further bad luck to 24th Foot’s fate
right across its axis of advance was a large water pond between the Sikh
position and the British unit. 24th Foot thus had to break formation
across the pond bypassing it from left and right while some braver souls
attempted to wade through it. At this moment the Sikh artillery played
havoc with 24th Foot causing inflicting great slaughter.
THE BATTLE SCENE FROM THE MOUND IN THE REAR
24th Foot
did reach the Sikh guns but the punishment inflicted was too severe. As
close quarter fighting started 24th Foot soon lost many officers
including its commanding officer. The unit had not loaded its muskets
and had advanced too fast thus reaching the Sikh position unsupported by
both native units. Beveridge states that the unit advanced at a double
time pace because of misunderstanding on part of two officers leading
the brigade, however this view is not substantiated by either Fortescue
or Gough and Innes. The native units advancing more carefully, while
preserving their energy for the final assault under the more experienced
British officers of the East India Company’s private army did finally
attack the Sikh position, a few minutes after 24th Foot’s attack,
suffering many casualties in the process but by this time HM 24th Foot
was close to the breaking point The Sikhs counterattacked and the 24th
Foot broke up and withdrew in disorder back into the jungle towards
Chillianwalla. The native units also withdrew. Pennycuick, his son
Lieutenant Pennycuick and his brigade major all died in the bloody
engagement. In all Penycuicks brigade lost some 376 men killed (244
from HM 24 Foot and, 112 from 25 NI, and 20 from 45 NI) and about 417
wounded (266 from HM 24 Foot, 92 from 25 NI and 59 from 45 NI). The
brigade fought well but failed because of sheer tactical ineptitude of
HM 24 Foot in advancing too rapidly and because of its blind obedience
to Campbell’s instructions regarding use of bayonets apart from lack of
artillery support. Pennycuick’s brigade’s remnants arrived in driblets
back to their start line east of the jungle.
Brigadier Hoggan’s attack
Campbell’s
left brigade whom Campbell accompanied fared better. It was well
supported by artillery and HM 61 Foot was a better-led and trained unit.
The native units on the flanks of HM 61 Foot knew their job and their
pace of advance in any case depended on the European unit in the middle.
The reader may note that the British always cleverly placed the
European unit in the middle so that the thankless and dirty job of
looking after the flanks where most of the Enfilading fire came was
assigned to the native units! Soon after commencing advance Hoggan’s
brigade lost touch with Pennycuick’s brigade because of the jungle.
Once it crossed the jungle it arrived right in front of a gap in the
Sikh line in between the Sikh left flank of their (Sikhs) right division
and the right flank of the Sikh centre. Fortescue denies this and
states that once Hoggan’s brigade appeared out of the jungle there were
Sikh troops in front of it. However Fortescue does admit that Hoggan’s
brigade was able to advance thanks to massive concentration of some 29
British artillery pieces i.e. Mowatt’s battery on Hoggans right and
Colonel Brind’s three horse-artillery batteries (troops) on the left.
These British guns as per Fortescue were able to silence an excellently
sited Sikh heavy battery which otherwise was ideally placed to enfilade
the advance of the entire brigade. In any case whether there was a gap
in front of Hoggan’s brigade as Malleson asserts or not as Fortescue
would like us to believe Hoggan’s brigade successfully advanced onwards
and after doing its job in the front wheeled northwards towards
Pennycuick’s supposed position, while the cavalry brigade along with
Colonel Brind’s horse artillery troops ably performed the task of flank
protection and defeated a Sikh attempt to attack Hoggan’s brigade’s
flank from the south by well directed artillery fire and a sharp cavalry
charge. However in the process one squadron of HM 3rd Lancers lost
contact with the brigade while pursuing the Sikh cavalry.
This
squadron was in turn counterattacked by Sikh cavalry and in the process
lost 23 men killed. This squadron only re joined its parent unit at the
end of the days fighting and thus was a major reason why Brigadier
White was unable to utilise his brigade more effectively to attack the
Sikhs from the left. Hoggan’s brigade now advanced northwards wheeling
right and took in the flank the Sikh troop which had defeated
Pennycuicks brigade. The Sikhs were outflanked and fought well but
Hoggan’s brigade evicted them from their position and continued its
advance northwards rolling up the Sikh flank from the south. Hoggan’s
brigade continued its advance till it finally met Major General
Gilbert’s left brigade. The reader may note that Hoggan’s brigade was
sucessful in joining up with Mountain’s brigade i.e. Sir Walter Gilberts
left brigade because Mountain’s brigade attacked the Sikhs facing
Hoggan’s brigade from their unguarded north rear.
For
Beveridge's claim of HM 24 Foot advancing double time see
Page-650-Beveridge-Op Cit. Fortescue merely states that HM 24 Foot
"pushed on rapidly" being a battalion which was "very strong" and
composed of "young soldiers" (Refers, Fortescue, Op Cit, 452). Gough
and Innes does not say that HM 24 Foot advanced rapidly but state that
Brigadier Pennycuick advanced rapidly , implying that the error of
advancing too fast was committed at brigade level and by Brigadier
Pennycuick ( Refers Page-222- Gough and Innes- Op Cit). Malleson states
that Pennycuick's brigade suffered because it had to charge 300 yards
of distance in open space in face of Sikh troops whose front had been
strengthened by many guns and that the men were exhausted before
reaching the guns and thus " broke from the charging pace at the moment
that it was most important to have continued it" (Refers
Page-418-Malleson , Op Cit). However Malleson states that the brigade
did capture the guns but was forced to withdraw soon afterwards due to a
Sikh counterattack.
Illahi
Baksh the commander of Sikh artillery defected to the British lines on
19th of January six days after Chillianwalla Ilahi Baksh's departure
left the Sikh artillery leaderless and played an important role in poor
efficiency of Sikh artillery at the Battle of Gujrat where the Sikhs
were decisively defeated. Ilahi Baksh gave the British valuable
information about the Sikh army and about Sikh fears about British
artillery which Ilahi Baksh felt was poorly utilised at Chillianwalla.
Refers Pages-235 & 236-Gough and Innes- Op Cit. The reader may
note that many wholly Punjabi Muslim batteries of the Sikh army were
inducted later in the British artillery e. g, the Hafiz Baksh's (four
guns ) and Fazal Ali's troops (two guns) of Horse Artillery of the
Khalsa of the old Sikh Durbar, which was re-designated as No. 2 Battery
raised at Bannu on 18 May 1849 by Lieutenant H. Hammond an officer from
the (Hindustani manned) Bengal Artillery, in accordance with Lord
Dalhousie's brilliant policy of rehabilitating all Punjabi soldiers of
the Khalsa whether Sikh or Muslim. Similarly the No. 3 Battery raised at
Dera Ghazi Khan by Lieutenant Mc Neill of the Bengal Artillery was also
largely composed of ex Punjabi Muslim and some Sikh Horse artillery men
from the old Khalsa Sikh artillery.
Conduct of
Pope’s Cavalry Brigade leading to disaster on the right flank. We have
earlier stated that Brigadier Pope’s cavalry brigade was tasked to
protect the right flank of the army of Punjab. Pope’s cavalry brigade
consisted of HM 14th Light Dragoons, HM 9th Lancers 1st Bengal Native
Light Cavalry (1 LC) , and 6th LC. The European cavalry regiment
average strength was approximately 400 Sabres and Native Cavalry
Regiment strength was approximately 30 sabres. Brigadier Pope was from
6th LC and had more than forty years service. He was a brave and
dashing officer in his earlier years but was not really physically or
mentally fit to command cavalry brigade in action. The 6th Bengal Native
Light Cavalry the readers may note was one of the most illustrious
units of the native cavalry. One of its most illustrious feats was a
daring charge an the battle of Sitabldi in the Third Maratha War where
it dispersed a Maratha force of about 18,000 men including 3,000 Arab
mercenaries. This battle was unique in the sense that there were no
British units present and the battle was an all Indian show barring the
British officers of the native units.
HM 9TH ROYAL LANCERS WHICH ALSO SHAMELESSLY BOLTED AWAY FROM THE BATTLEFIELD FOLLOWING HM 14 LIGHT DRAGOONS SHAMELESS FLIGHT
Pope
notwithstanding his dash as a young officer, was an invalid in 1849 ,
and one who could hardly sit on horseback. As soon as the British
advance commenced Pope with the cavalry brigade on the right flank also
advanced. Immediately a body of Sikh cavalry emerging from the high
ground around Rasul, made a threatening demonstration towards Popes
right rear flank. Pope detached a wing (half regiment) each of HM 9th
Lancers and 1st and 6th LC under the overall command of Colonel Lane to
observe them and to act as a flank protection screen. Lane deployed his
force a little northwards and thus lost visual contact with the
remaining British army ,because of the intervening strips of jungle.
Pope continued his advance westwards with the remaining brigade, some
nine cavalry squadrons, i. e HM 14th Light Dragoons (HM 14 LD) and wing
each of 1st and 6th LC and HM 9th Lancers. Soon another body of Sikh
cavalry appeared in front of Pope’s axis of advance. The Bengal Horse
artillery the best branch of the British immediately deployed into
action to engage these Sikhs. However Pope, without thinking of
anything decided to charge the Sikhs , also masking the British
artillery’s fire in line formation. The result was a weak charge
without any depth or artillery support, delivered in words of Gough and
Innes without speed or momentum. The Sikh horsemen led by Jawahir Singh
Nalwa the bold and dashing son of Sardar Hari Singh Nalwa now realising
that poor execution and bad terrain had brought Pope’s apology of a
cavalry charge to an absolute halt now counter charged. Jawahir Singh
with his band of horsemen emerged, once again, through the wild Doab
jungle, and charged Popes force, in the process of which some Sikh
horsemen physically attacked Brigadier Pope, cutting him across the head
with his Tulwar, and wounding him. At this critical stage of the
battle Pope’s brigade which had already halted and was waiting for
orders, now became leaderless. An event then occurred which the British
historians right from 1849 onwards find hard to explain or account for.
HM 14th Light Dragoon turned about and bolted! The native cavalry also
panicked and followed HM 14th Light Dragoon rearwards, galloping
through at top speed through their own horse artillery batteries
backwards! Fortescue states that HM 14th Light Dragoon bolted because
Pope gave them a word of command of “Threes Right” which they heard as
something like “Threes about” 66 and that’s why the unit bolted! There
is no doubt that had a native cavalry unit done so Fortescue’s verdict
may have been much harsher! Jawahir Singh Nalwa pursued Pope’s cavalry
brigade with great elan, cutting down many British Horse artillerymen
including Major Christie, one of the battery commanders , destroying six
guns and carrying four guns intact apart from two ammunition wagons and
fifty three horses as war trophies! Pope’s cavalry brigade from this
moment onwards ceased to be a fighting formation! It was rallied with
great difficulty by Gough’s staff and the regimental Chaplain of HM 14
LD, with his pistol! It was said that Gough recommended the Chaplain to
be promoted to the rank of Brevet Bishop, on the battlefield! The flight
of Pope’s brigade resulted in a serious operational imbalance in the
British position. Their right rear flank was now vulnerable to counter
attack. Sher Singh Attariwalla immediately ordered a counter attack and
Sikh infantry and cavalry west of Rasul immediately advanced down from
the heights through the open gap encircling Gilbert’s division from the
rear! It was Pope’s good luck that he died soon afterwards from wounds
suffered in the battle.
NOW THE
BRITISH LIES WHICH CONTINUE TILL TO THIS DATE WITHOUT SHAME! A WEBSITE
CALLED BRISH BATTLES, LINK GIVEN BELOW HAS THE FOLLOWING LIES TO NARRATE
ABOUT THE CAVALRY BRIGADES FLIGHT
Pope led
his brigade at the trot through the broken scrub without the precaution
of skirmishers in advance. At the sight of a body of Sikh cavalry, the
BLC squadrons in the centre of the line halted, forcing the British
regiments on the flanks to stop in conformity. The Sikhs charged the
BLC squadrons which turned about and made off. The two British
regiments did the same, all attempts by the officers to halt their
soldiers being to no avail.
The
precipitous withdrawal of the cavalry regiments left the brigade horse
artillery battery unprotected and in the confusion of limbering up, the
battery was overrun by the Sikh cavalry who captured two guns.
Eventually two other guns came into action and were sufficient to drive
the Sikh cavalry back.
http://www.britishbattles.com/second-sikh-war/chillianwallah.Html
NOTE ON SUICIDE OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL KING COMMANDING OFFICER OF 14 LIGHT DRAGOONS IN 1850
HM 14 light
Dragoons is now known as 14/20 Hussars. General Sir Charles Napier
Commander in Chief unwittingly commended HM 14 Light Dragoons on parade
during a visit at which the regimental trumpeter said "our commanding
officer Lieutenant Colonel King is a coward". Lieutenant Colonel King
was severely overwhelmed and committed suicide. Meanwhile lies continue
to this day when thev website British Battles says that Colonel King
told Brigadier Pope to attack the Sikhs whereas the actual position was
that poor old man Brigadier Pope (of the indomitable 6th Light Cavalry
-all Ranghars or Aghas) was already mortally wounded with a sikh sword
striking his head and died the same night. Now there is a reason here.
The class conscious British despised Brigadier Pope because he was from
the native cavalry of the English East India Company's Bengal Army.
SARDAR SHER SINGH THE REAL SIKH HERO OF CHILLIANWALLAH
Major
General Sir Walter Raleigh Gilbert’s attack Major General Walter Gilbert
commanding the right division consisting of Brigadier White and
Mountain’s Brigades was a far more experienced man than Campbell or
Gough. He had seen action in the First Sikh War and was not only an
extremely brave leader of men but also a relatively more sensible man as
compared to Gough and Colin Campbell. Walter functioned as an
effective division commander and coordinated the advance of both his
brigade’s well Brigadier Mountain’s Brigade on the left encountered
stiff Sikh resistance. The 56th NI its right flanking unit ran into an
excellently sited Sikh position and was counterattacked by an
overwhelming number of Sikhs. The unit fought well but was repulsed
after losing in the process 8 officers and 322 men killed and wounded.
The other two units i. e HM 29th Foot and the 30 NI were however more
successful and captured the Sikh positions opposite Lulianee spiking a
large number of Sikh artillery guns and rendering the ineffective. As a
result of success of HM 29 Foot and 30 NI 56 NI was rallied and joined
the brigade. It may be noted that Mountain’s brigade attacked the Sikhs
facing Hoggan’s brigade advancing from the south and thus enabled
Hoggan’s brigade to defeat those Sikhs. Gilbert’s right brigade i.e.
Brigade Godby’s brigade performed relatively better than Mountain’s
brigade. The brigade able supported by artillery successfully cleared
all Sikh positions in its front and drove the Sikhs close to the river
Jhelum opposite the village of Tupai. Godby then halted his brigade in
order to reorganise before the final attack driving into the Sikh’s once
he was suddenly attacked by the Sikhs in force from his rear. How this
happened will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
GILBERT AND HOGGANS BREAKOUT TO THE REAR
Gilbert’s Counteractions and final British withdrawal
We had
already left Gilbert discussing Major General Gilbert’s action when
Gilbert’s brigades suddenly found themselves under attack from their
rear. Brigaier Godby whose brigade bore the brunt of the Sikh counter
attack from the rear reacted in a most resolute manner to the sudden
Sikh threat from his rear! The day was however saved by brilliant
handling of artillery by Major Dawes of No 17 Field Battery. Dawes
immediately moved his battery to the right flank and brought such an
effective fire on the Sikhs attacking Godby’s brigade that the Sikh
counter attack was broken up. Almost at the same time Godby gave an
order of “Right about face” to his brigade and attacked towards the rear
shattering the Sikhs attacking his rear. Mountain’s brigade whose rear
was also threatened although relatively far less than Godby’s also
counterattacked rear wards and dispersed the Sikhs threatening his rear
by this time the reader may note Hogn’s brigade had also joined
Mountain. At this stage of battle Brigadier Penny’s reserve brigade
which had been ordered by Gough to take Pennycuick’s position after
Pennycuicks brigades repulse had entered the jungle, lost its way and
moved north-westwards instead of south westwards now suddenly emerged
out of the jungle in front of Gilbert’s division, now breaking out
eastwards and so played a marginal role in reducing the Sikh threat to
the rear of Gilbert’s division.
By now
darkness was approaching and Colonel Lane, all throughout unaware of
what was happening emerged from the jungle and attacked the retreating
Sikhs, who had attacked Gilbert’s rear from his position in the right
rear. Gough now decided to withdraw what remained of his demoralised
army to Chillianwalla. All the wounded that could be found were carried
back to Chillianwalla in the darkness 73. The British had failed to
dislodge the Sikhs , the only adversary in India Afghanistan Nepal and
Iran which checked a British army with more than three British infantry
regiments and above 10,000 men in open country, without the safety of
any fortress walls like Seringapatam Bhurtpore or Delhi or any mountain
fastness like Nepal Afghanistan or the Trans Indus Frontier regions! It
was a unique honour never broken by any other British adversary from
1757 till 1947!
ANALYSIS
British Casualties
The
casualties that the British suffered were relatively much larger in
proportion as compared to any battle that they fought later or earlier
at least as far as unit averages were concerned. There are in many
aspects of this issue. Firstly native casualties Vis a Vis British unit
casualties proved that the natives fought as well as the British
despite no national motivation to do so. Secondly most British
casualties especially those of HM 24th Foot occurred not because of
greater valour but simple tactical ineptitude. Thirdly the casualties
suffered were much higher at least in proportion to casualties suffered
by the Indian Army in any subsequent war including the two world wars or
even the 1965 and 1971 wars as far as the two Indo Pak armies are
concerned. The total British casualties were 2,357, sub divided as 602
killed (including 22 British officers), 1,651 wounded and 104 missing
(which in reality were killed). The vast bulk of cavalry casualties
were borne by Brigadier White’s brigade, which performed its task in an
THE BATTLE OF CHILLIANWALA AS A TEST CASE OF COMBAT PERFORMANCE OF EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS
Immediately
from 1857 onwards the British officers particularly those of the Royal
Army and some officers of the Company’s private army started vigorous
propaganda campaign against the native troops from south of Ambala
areas. They floated a theory that the races south of Ambala in general
and East of Jumna in particular were non martial and had performed
poorly in the Sikh Wars. I have selected battle of Chillianwalla fought
in the second Sikh War which was the last major battle fought by the
Bengal Army against the Khalsa Sikh Army on 13 January 1849. The battle
was unique in the following ways.
(1) The
Punjabi but Sikh Khalsa Army was without any doubt the toughest opponent
of the British in entire west Asia. Their battle performance was
superior to any other Army which the British encountered in entire India
Nepal Burma Afghanistan or Iran.
(2) The
battle was fought in a plain territory unlike the Gurkha War or the
Afghan Wars where the Gurkhas or Afghans made good use of very adverse
terrain. The Sikh position was based on a ridge which was an
insignificant feature as compared to Afghanistan or Nepal’s terrain.
(3) The
British Army at Chillianwala was logistically absolutely sound being
well supplied unlike the First Afghan War where the British were more
than 1500 miles from their supply base and on quarter rations. The
battle was fought in a mild Punjab winter unlike adverse snowfall and
below freezing temperature during the British retreat from Kabul.
(4) The
battle was unique in the sense that a British army with more than 12,000
troops suffered a reverse which was unique as the only instance of the
type in the entire military history of the British Army in India
Pakistan Afghanistan, Iran and Nepal! Bhurtpur and Delhi were different
since in both these places the defenders were behind the security of
artificial man made fortifications. The battle saw a renowned Royal
Army regiment of Cavalry ie HM 14th Light Dragoons running away from the
battlefield in utter panic. Their glorious flight was only checked
after they were profanely abused by their Chaplain at pistol point! The
casualties suffered by the native troops in this battle do not reflect
any sort of demoralisation or battle weariness as alleged by British
writers from 1857 onwards. No native regiment broke up and fled the
battlefield like HM 14th Light Dragoons! We will let the figures speak
for themselves and allow the reader to form his own conclusions.
THE BRITISH INDIAN MILITARY LEGACY
Failure to
utilise artillery properly, reliance on frontal attacks, blind obedience
to orders and lack of professional attitude as exhibited at
Chillianwalla were inherited by both Pakistan and Indian armies right
through 1965 1971 and even as late as 1992 as proved by Brigadier
Anwari-Major General Abbasi joint attack at Siachen in 1992 The Battle
of Barapind in 1971 is yet another example of the Gough legacy of
military incompetence at corps brigade and division level. In short the
state of affairs at Chillianwalla was inherited by us right till today
i.e. extremely brave young officers, dedicated and self less troops but
highly incompetent commanders from unit onwards!
Postscript
The British
buried their dead at Chillianwalla but soon after Gough’s army marched
from Chillianwala, most of the British dead were torn out of their
shallow graves by hyena’s and jackals. Later the British reburied their
dead and made a beautiful cemetery that exists to date although poorly
maintained. The locals of Chillianwalla called the place “Katalgarh” or
“House of Slaughter” in memory of the bloody battle78. Very close to
the obelisk created in the memory of the battle was the village of
“Mong” which as per one archaeologist was built on the ancient city of
Nikaea built by Alexander in commemoration of his victory over Raja
Porus in the battle of Hydaspus fought almost on the same location as
Chillianwalla.
Sher Singh
Attariwalla was a brilliant military commander. But he was fighting
against the ruthless tide of history. Today few know about him outside
the Sikh community, but there is no doubt that he was a great military
commander of the sub continent! Gough finally defeated the Sikh Army at
Gujerat on 21 February 1849, where he simply allowed his artillery to do
the job. Sher Singh was outgunned and forced to fight in more open
country because of starvation and blockade. He died in exile at Benares
in 1858. Sardar Jowahir Singh Nalwa another hero of the battle joined
the 1st Sikh Cavalry in 1857 against the same Hindustani Hindu and
Muslim sepoys who had fought against him under Gough at Chillianwalla
and Gujerat! He distinguished himself as a Risaldar of 1st Sikh Cavalry
in 1857 and later became an honorary magistrate at Gujranwalla finally
dying in 1877. Most of the native infantry cavalry and artillery units
that had served the British so devotedly at Chillianwalla rebelled in
1857 or were disbanded. Only 31 NI and 70 NI survived the rebellion!
The 1st Light Cavalry, a fine unit of Ranghars and Hindustani Pathan
Muslims of Rohtak and Rohailkhand and some Hindustani Rajput Hindus
rebelled at Mhow, rode all the way to Delhi and later at Lucknow and
finally was dispersed and destroyed in the Himalayan rainforest of
Terai! One of its native officers Risaldar Ghous Khan (a Hindustani
Pathan from, Rohtak district, which was transferred to loyal Punjab in
1857 as a punishment for rebellion) was the sepoy cavalry commander at
the siege of Delhi and played a prominent role in raiding British
convoys on the Karnal-Delhi road The 46 NI was destroyed at the battle
of Trimmu Ghat in Gurdaspur on the Ravi river. It was marching from
Sialkot to Delhi and was intercepted by Brigadier General Nicholson’s
movable column. The 56 NI was one of the units that rebelled at Cawnpore
in 1857. The 20 NI rebelled at Meerut in May 1857 and marched to Delhi.
The 25 NI a brave unit was luckier. It was disbanded at Benares in
1857. The 36 NI and 6th Light Cavalry were part of the Jullundhur
brigade in 1857. Both rebelled and marched all the way from Jullundhur
to Delhi in 1857 and fought against the British till their final
destruction in the Nepalese Jungle of Terai where Lord Clyde (Brigadier
Campbell of Chillianwalla) drove it in December 1858. 30 NI rebelled at
Naeerabad in Rajputana in 1857 and marched to Delhi. 69 NI was destroyed
at Multan in 1857 once it rebelled. The 45 NI located at ferozpur in
1857 rebelled and marched all the way to Delhi. The 3rd Irregular
Cavalry rebelled at Saugor in 1857 while 31 NI also stationed at Saugor
fought against it to protect the British officers and non combatants.
9th Irregular Cavalry unlucky in being stationed at Hoshiarpur in loyal
Punjab and was also disbanded. 5th and 8th Light Cavalry which had
provided the nucleus to raise most Punjab Cavalry units were disbanded
at Peshawar and Lahore respectively in 1857. It was at this juncture
that one of the author’s ancestors, then in 8th Light Cavalry, joined
the Punjab Police through the good offices of a British officer.
Many
British units that fought shoulder to shoulder with the native units at
Chillianwalla were employed against the same units in 1857! HM 24 Foot ,
which was stationed at Rawalpindi in 1857 , was used to disarm 28th NI
at Rawalpindi and to fight the 14th NI at Jhelum. The 61st Foot and the
2nd European and HM 9th
Lancers marched to Delhi in 1857 and played a leading role in the
assault on the city in September 1857. HM 14th Light Dragoons
participated in the central India campaign in 1857, which was a very
minor affair in terms of battle casualties. Brigadier Penny was killed
in a sepoy ambush in Rohailkhand in 1858. Colin Campbell later fought
the Crimean War and returned to India in 1857 as C in C Bengal Army
(Overall C in C India) and was given the title of Lord Clyde. His
overcautious conduct as a military commander in 1857-58 was much
criticised.
The British
forgot the brave conduct of the Hindustani Sepoys at Chilllianwalla
once these sepoys rebelled against them in 1857 and from 1857 onwards
started calling them non martial races! As if HM 14 Light Dragoon was
from a martial race! What matters in the final analysis is how well a
unit fought, not the army or race or religion to which it belonged! It’s
the spirit of man that matters in the final reckoning!
http://sowingseedsofthought.blogspot.com/2010/06/battle-of-chillianwala-major-british.html
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