By OP Gupta, IFS (Retd)
The countries that have made the strongest demands for permanent seats are Brazil, Germany, India and Japan. Japan and Germany are the UN's second and third largest fund contributors, respectively, while Brazil, the largest Latin American nation, and India, the world's largest democracy and second most populous country, are two of the largest contributors of troops to UN-mandated peace-keeping missions.
In 1953 or so India was offered China's permanent seat in the UNSC then held by Taiwan but Jawaharlal Nehru rejected it saying that it was an American effort to marginalise the Communist China. In his book Nehru: The Invention of India Shashi Tharoor, a former UN Under-Secretary has also confirmed that Nehru turned down a US offer for India to take Permanent Seat in the Security Council held by Taiwan, and Nehru urged that it be offered to Beijing instead. So India missed a golden opportunity to be in the UNSC as a Permanent Member with veto.
On July 26, 2005, five UN Member countries, Argentina, Italy, Canada, Colombia and Pakistan, representing a larger group of countries called (Uniting for Consensus), proposed to General Assembly another plan that maintains five Permanent Members, and raises the number of Non-Permanent Members to 20 from 10. On April 11, 2005, China had "endorsed" this proposal.
In view of stiff opposition offered behind the curtain by the People's Republic of China and open opposition of the members of the Coffee Club, Japan panicked and offered to accept Permanent Membership without veto power or that Japan would not exercise veto power for many initial years. Such dilutions were not acceptable to India and to African aspirants.
Despite forging the so-called strategic alliance with the USA, and, despite having agreed to curtail military application of nuclear technology in India under the unequal Indo-US nuclear deal, the UPA government failed to get Bush presidency support for Indian case for Permanent Membership with veto power.
At the recent conclave of foreign ministers of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) held in May 2008 at Yekaterinburg, Russia, China refused to endorse Russian proposal of supporting India?s bid for a permanent seat in the UNSC in the joint communique issued at the end of this meeting.
In 1953 Nehru threw to winds the golden offer to place India in the UNSC with veto powers. In September 2008 the UPA failed to place India in the UNSC as a Permanent Member with veto power. Since then UPA government has put this matter on back burner.
Every student of international politics knows that under the Monroe Doctrine [1823] and the Roosevelt Corollary [1940] an important foreign policy objective of the USA has been to exercise hegemony over Latin America. The unstated objective of the USA is not to support any Latin American country for Permanent Membership of the UNSC. Thus by openly and formally linking its candidature with that of Brazil in the format of G-4, the UPA Government ensured that the USA shall cold shoulder Indian candidature.
India rightly aspires to become a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council with full veto power as [1] India is one of the founding Members of the United Nations Organisation, [2] India is the largest democracy with the second largest population of the world, [3] India has been one of the largest contributors of manpower to the peacekeeping operations of the UNO, and, [4] Indian economy is the fourth largest on purchasing power parity basis. There has been substantial goodwill and support to this just aspiration of India in the international community but the UPA Government due to its myopic policies and arrogant attitude of its senior functionaries especially towards small countries failed in harnessing and channelising this support to achieve the goal. The UPA government on one hand failed to enlist clear support of USA and China; and, on the other hand, by joining the G-4 forced even supporting countries to oppose India sponsored motion as they were/are against inclusion of either Japan or Brazil or Germany in the UNSC. The UPA government could not foresee that joining the G-4 could result into lining of opponents of the other three aspirants against India.
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the principal organs charged with the maintenance of international peace and security. Its powers include the establishment of peacekeeping operations, the establishment of international sanctions, and the authorisation of military action.
Under chapter six of the Charter, 'Pacific Settlement of Disputes', the Security Council investigates any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute. The Council may recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment if it determines that the situation might endanger international peace and security. The recommendations under chapter six are not binding on the UN Members. The UNSC resolutions pertaining to J&K being chapter VI resolutions are neither binding on India nor can be enforced by the UN.
Under chapter seven, the Council has broader power to decide what measures are to be taken in situations involving "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression". In such situations, the Council is not limited to merely making recommendations but may take action, including the use of armed force 'to maintain or restore international peace and security'. This was the basis for UN armed action in Korea in 1950 during the Korean War and the use of coalition forces in Iraq and Kuwait in 1991. Decisions taken under chapter seven, such as economic sanctions, are also binding on UN Members.
As per 1946 provisions there are 15 Members of the Security Council, consisting of five Permanent Members, also called P-5 countries [China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA] and ten Members each elected for two years period. The Security Council?s five Permanent Members have the power to veto any substantive resolution. Procedural matters are not subject to a veto, so the veto cannot be used to avoid discussion of an issue.
The five Permanent Members were drawn from the victorious powers of World War II, and in 1946, the Security Council consisted of France, the Republic of China [non-Communist], the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR. There have been two seat changes since then viz.
[i] China's seat was originally filled by the non-communist Republic of China. In 1971, the People?s Republic of China [Communist] was awarded China?s seat in the United Nations by the UN General Assembly Resolution 2758. Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi?s governments continuously supported the case for replacing the [non-Communist] Republic of China [Taiwan] by the [Communist] People's Republic of China in the UNSC. Before the establishment of the Security Council in 1946, the USSR and the UK were against China?s position in it, however the USA had insisted that China [non-Communist] should be in the Security Council as a Permanent Member.
[ii] Russian Federation, being the legal successor state to the Soviet Union after the latter's collapse in 1991, acquired the original-Soviet seat, including the Soviet Union?s former representation in the Security Council.
The five Permanent Members of the Security Council are the only nations recognised as possessing nuclear weapons under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, although some countries with nuclear weapons [India, Pakistan etc] have not signed the NPT treaty.
Ten other Members of the UNSC are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms starting on January 1, with five replaced each year. The members are chosen by regional groups and confirmed by the United Nations General Assembly. The African bloc chooses three Members; the Latin America and the Caribbean, Asian, and Western European and other blocs choose two Members each; and the Eastern European bloc chooses one Member. Also, one of these Members is an Arab country, alternately from the Asian or African bloc.
In 1953 or so India was offered China's permanent seat in the UNSC then held by Taiwan but Jawaharlal Nehru rejected it saying that it was an American effort to marginalise the Communist China. In his book Nehru: The Invention of India Shashi Tharoor, a former UN Under Secretary has also confirmed that Nehru turned down a US offer for India to take permanent seat in the Security Council held by Taiwan, and Nehru urged that it be offered to Beijing instead. So India missed a golden opportunity to be in the UNSC as a Permanent Member with veto.
With continuous change in the world political and economic scene it was being felt in the international community that 1946 composition of the UNSC had become outdated and needed democratisation to reflect the current realities.
On March 21, 2005, the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called on the UN to reach a consensus on the September 2004 Earth Summit on expanding the council to 24 Members. He suggested two alternatives for expansion, but did not specify which proposal he preferred. The two options mentioned by Annan are: [i] Plan A calls for creating six new Permanent Members, plus three new non-Permanent Members for a total of 24 seats in the Council. [ii] Plan B calls for creating eight new seats in a new class of Members, who would serve for four years, subject to renewal, plus one non-permanent seat, also for a total of 24.
The countries that have made the strongest demands for Permanent Seats are Brazil, Germany, India and Japan. Japan and Germany are the UN's second and third largest fund contributors, respectively, while Brazil, the largest Latin American nation, and India, the world's largest democracy and second most populous country, are two of the largest contributors of troops to UN-mandated peace-keeping missions. These four countries [known as G-4] joined in some sort of a pact obviously to pool their resources to support each other's aspirations to become Permanent Members of the expanded Security Council. The push of G-4 in form of a resolution at UN General Assembly failed in September 2005.
In view of stiff opposition offered behind the curtain by the People's Republic of China and open opposition of the members of coffee club, Japan panicked and offered to accept Permanent Membership without veto power or that Japan would not exercise veto power for many initial years. Such dilutions were not acceptable to India and to African aspirants. However, Japan announced in January 2006 that it would not support a retabling of the G-4 resolution and was working on a resolution of its own.
Uniting for Consensus is a movement (nicknamed the Coffee Club) that developed in the 1990s in opposition to the possibility of expansion in the UNSC. It was later revived by Italy and now has about 40 members aiming to counter the G-4 nations' bids for Permanent Seats. The leaders are Italy, South Korea, Mexico, Argentina and Pakistan. Argentina, Colombia, Mexico 'opposed to a bid for Brazil; Italy, Netherlands, Spain' opposed to a bid for Germany (wishing for a seat for the whole European Union); People's Republic of China, South Korea - opposed to a bid for Japan; and, Pakistan - opposed to a bid for India. Canada - opposed in principle to expansion not achieved by consensus or near-consensus.
On July 26, 2005, five UN Member countries, Argentina, Italy, Canada, Colombia and Pakistan, representing a larger group of countries called Uniting for Consensus, proposed to the General Assembly another plan that maintains five Permanent Members, and raises the number of Non-Permanent Members to 20 from 10. On April 11, 2005, China had endorsed this proposal. In other words China is against induction of new Permanent Members.
Despite forging the so called strategic alliance with the USA, and, despite having agreed to curtail military application of nuclear technology in India under the unequal Indo-US nuclear deal, the UPA government failed to get Bush presidency support for Indian case for Permanent Membership with veto power.
The Peoples Republic of China actively canvassed to oppose the G-4 motion at the UNGA as it had decided to oppose Japan's inclusion in the UNSC.As early as October 2004 this writer then serving as Indian Ambassador to Finland had informed Delhi that the Chinese Politburo had taken a firm decision to oppose Japan's induction into UNSC for 'historical reasons,' therefore, India's case should not be linked with Japan's. The same source had also informed that there was no decision at the Politburo to support or to oppose India's case. In the January 14, 2008 communique, China did not offer clear support for our Permanent Membership but came to extent of only saying that China understands and supports India's aspirations to play a greater role in the UN including in the Security Council. Greater role does not necessarily mean Permanent Membership with veto.
Indian mandarins have been over enthusiastic in reading Chinese responses. In November 2006, Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee claimed that Chinese President Hu Jintao had reiterated that Beijing was in favour of New Delhi's inclusion as a Permanent Member of the Council. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's 2005 visit to India did not yield any definitive commitment that China would support India's case for a Permanent seat at the UNSC. Despite the assertion of Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon that President Hu had assured India on a bilateral visit in 2006 that China would not be an obstacle to New Delhi's bid for Permanent Membership of the Security Council, no concrete guarantee was secured in the Joint Declaration. At the recent conclave of foreign ministers of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) held in May 2008 at Yekaterinburg, Russia, China refused to endorse Russian proposal of supporting India's bid for a Permanent Seat in the UNSC in the joint communique issued at the end of the meeting.
This writer sought and secured clear and categorical support of all the countries to our Permanent Membership case wherever he served as Ambassador or High Commissioner. President Ben Mkapa of Tanzania told the Indian Press accompanying the then PM IK Gujral that he did not envisage expansion of UNSC without India being there as a Permanent Member. Deputy Prime Minister of Jamaica personally conveyed support of his government to Shri Jaswant Singh in New York. The Dominican Republic Government announced its support on floor of its Parliament. When I reached Helsinki in 2001 I was told that Finland was working on a joint formula with other Scandinavian countries so it could not give any support bilaterally, and, that, before seeking Finnish support India should first get regional support for its UNSC candidature but two years of my continuous efforts paid off when in summer of 2004 Finnish Foreign Minister said that Finland would support India being made a Permanent Member. Estonian Prime Minister publicly conveyed Estonian support to visiting Minister of State in the MEA [Shri Digvijay Singh]. Tunisia is not against.
In 1953 Nehru threw to winds the golden offer to place India in the UNSC with veto powers. In September 2008 the UPA failed to place India in the UNSC as a Permanent Member with veto power. Since then UPA government has put this matter on back burner. The new government must revive it and should avoid repeating mistake of forming G-4 type mechanism. Ekla chalo re appears the best tactics to achieve the goal while keeping all understandings with other countries behind the curtain. Every student of international politics knows that under the Monroe Doctrine [1823] and the Roosevelt Corollary [1940] an important foreign policy objective of the USA has been to exercise hegemony over Latin America. The unstated objective of the USA is not to support any Latin American country for Permanent Membership of the UNSC. Thus by openly and formally linking its candidature with that of Brazil in the format of G-4, the UPA Government ensured that the USA shall cold shoulder Indian candidature.
[The writer retired in the rank of Secretary to the Government of India in the Indian Foreign Service (1971 batch). He served as Ambassador to Finland, Estonia, Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Tunisia and Tanzania etc and; as Consul General, Dubai and Birmingham (UK).]
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